



Liberty Alliance & 'Touching the Browser'

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Subteam

Agenda



- Liberty Alliance overview
- Touching the Browser
- Liberty model
- Liberty SSO
- Extended SSO




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Identity Crisis



What is Federated Identity?



- → A federated identity is one whose scope extends beyond the original application(s) for which it was originally created
- Existing identities can be leveraged for other applications, simplifying management for enterprises and end-users
- Mechanisms for enabling this within an enterprise already exist - new requirements for cross-domain transactions demand new standards for the protocols and exchange formats

Making identity 'portable'



What is the Liberty Alliance?




- A business alliance, formed in Sept 2001 with the goal of establishing an open standard for federated identity management
- Global membership consists of consumerfacing companies and technology vendors as well as policy and government organizations
- The only open organization working to address the technology and business issues of federated identity management



Liberty Alliance Membership

Securing Digital Identities
& Information

- More than 170 global member organizations
- Driven by end-users, government orgs and vendors



Defining Liberty

Liberty Alliance IS...

- a member community delivering technical specifications, business and privacy best practices
- developing an open,
 federated identity standard
 that can be built into other
 companies' branded products
 and services
- providing a venue for testing interoperability and identifying business requirements
- driving convergence of open standards



Liberty Alliance IS NOT

- a consumer-facing product or service
- developed and supported by one company
- based on a centralized model for identity




Liberty & SAML



- Liberty builds heavily on SAML
 - Security Assertions Markup Language
- SAML is an XML-based framework for exchanging security information
 - XML schema and definition for security assertions
 - XML schema and definition for a request/response protocol
- An OASIS standard
 - Vendors and users are both involved
 - Codifies current system outputs rather than inventing new technology
- Excellent traction in the marketplace



Liberty Roadmap





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Touching the Browser?



- → A model in which User Agent's baseline capabilities can be dynamically extended
- Functionality downloaded as needed
 - May be invisible to User
 - May be cached for subsequent use
- Plug-ins, ActiveX, Java applets
- Contrasts with 'working with what you get'



ssues



- Locked-down user agents
 - For security & virus protection
- Download size
 - Mitigated by caching
- User aversion
 - Dreaded 'trust this' query?
- Inconsistent functionality
 - Is Java enabled



What might 'Touching the Browser' mean for federated identity



Functional Areas

- Discovery Can user agent facilitate determination of appropriate providers?
- Protocols Can user agent play active role in messaging?
- Attributes Can user agent store and release Principal's attributes?
- Security Can user agent provide security protections beyond the base set?

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Liberty model



- Liberty default model is to 'work with what you get'
- → Touching the Browser model complicated by the variety of User Agents we'd need to deal with
- **⇒** Liberty does not preclude dynamic extension capabilities but does not require them
- Account for different User Agents in order to leverage their different capabilities



Liberty profiles



- Liberty must support a variety of User Agents
 - Old browsers, new browsers, Phones, PDAs, etc.
- User Agents differ in the functionality and capabilities
- Liberty defines base protocols for enabling federated identity messaging between providers
- Abstract protocols are profiled for the 'real-world'
- The various Liberty profiles make different expectations of User Agent capabilities



Baseline Liberty Requirements



- **→** HTTP 1.0 or HTTP 1.1
- SSL 3.0 or TLS 1.0 or any subsequent protocols which are backwards compatible
 - either directly or via a proxy
- Minimum maximum URL length of 256 bytes.
- → A WAP browser user agent MUST support WML 1.0,1.1, 1.2 or 1.3 in addition to the above requirements.

This is the 'what we get'



Optional 'requirements'



Cookies

- Enables Identity Provider discovery
- Prevents the 'Who is your IDP question?'

Javascript

- Streamlines the Form POST profile by automatically submitting forms
- Prevents the Principal from having to click on Submit/Continue buttons

→ SOAP

LEC profile stipulates that User Agent actively sends SOAP messages



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Single Sign-On



- Simplest aspect of federated identity
- ➤ An individual is able to access a remote service based on an authentication event that occurred elsewhere
- Liberty ID-Federation Framework builds on SAML SSO protocols and messages
- Authentication Web site (Identity Provider) communicates a SAML assertion to that effect to the relying Web site (Service Provider)





User Experience




Step 1: Federate (link) Accounts









Step 2: Single sign-on







Pseudonyms

- **Entrust**°
- SSO requires that sites talk about the User Securing Digital Identities about the User Securing Digital Identities
- Privacy concerns rule out a global identifier
- Liberty defines mechanism for opaque identifiers



IDP account

John123@idp

Federation info

Domain: SP_1.com Name: dTvliRcMlpCqV6xX

Domain: SP_2.com
Alias: xyrVdSxg0/pzSgx
Name: pfk9uzUN9JcWmk4RF

SP1 account

John_s@sp1

Federation info

Domain: IDP_A.com Name: dTvliRcMlpCqV6xX

SP2 account

John 0811@sp2

Federation info


Domain: IDP_A.com

Alias: pfk9uzUN9JcWmk4RF Name: xyrVdSxg0/pzSgx

Liberty SSO Protocol Flow



- Instead of the SP directly authenticating the user the SP queries the IdP and the IdP issues an authentication assertion
- SP must 'trust' the IDP





Authentication Assertion



Assertion ID

Issuer

Issue Instant (timestamp)

Validity time limit

Audience Restriction

Authentication Statement

Authentication Method

Authentication Instant

User account info (IdP pseudonym)

User account info (SP pseudonym)

Digital Signature of assertion



ssues



User will access SP resources based on their authentication to the IDP

- The strength of this authentication is critical
- Liberty defined a syntax by which SP can indicate its preferences and by which the IDP can assert the details
- Liberty doesn't stipulate but likely default mechanism will be Password

Browser gap between SSL sessions

- Liberty makes extensive use of HTTP redirects
- Liberty stipulates SSL but there will be two separate sessions
- Not Liberty issues per se but they're there nonetheless



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Extended SSO



- Certificate-based authentication to IDP would address weak password issue
 - Client-auth SSL theoretically possible but key management & roaming limitations make impractical
- Message signing capability in browser would address SSL gap issue
 - XML Signature support in the browser?
- Extend the browser with certificate-based authentication and message signing capabilities



Entrust TruePass™




- Entrust TruePass is a Web based client/server solution
- TruePass Client is a small Java applet (~150kb) that gets downloaded in a hidden frame of the HTML page
- Digital Certificate based strong authentication; leverages server authenticated SSL session
- Digital Signature Support
- All digital ID lifecycle management operations are transparent to the user



Entrust TruePass authentication



- Applet downloaded to browser
- → User signs in (to applet) with strong password
- → Applet signs challenge string with user's private key.
- User is authenticated to server






Extended SSO







Summary



- **➡** Liberty does not stipulate mechanisms that would require 'touching the browser'.
- Liberty chose the 'work with what you get' model.
- However, Liberty does not preclude extending the browser's capabilities
- → An extended User Agent can coexist with Liberty specifications – optimizing baseline capabilities as appropriate.

